Tim Smith

Tomorrow Tim Smith will be speaking at the Rocky Mountain Civil War Roundtable.  We've developed a bit of a friendship (kinda hard to be really good friends when live a thousand miles apart) over the years of Shiloh study so I'm always glad to see him.

I was reading through my new Civil War News this weekend when I happened upon an article announcing he had won the Richard Barksdale Harwell Award from the Atlanta Civil War Roundtable.  Then I noticed that below his article was my review of the book that he won for, Shiloh: Conquer or Perish.  I knew I'd written the review but it was kinda cool to reappear there again.

Congratulations to Tim, well deserved.  I look forward to seeing him Tuesday.

Fallen Timbers

The final brand new spot for us to visit at Shiloh was Fallen Timbers.  After two days of comabt William T. Sherman followed the retreating Confederates with a small brigade.  Mostly this was done to make sure they were not preparing to begin a third day of battle than with thier own plans of bringing on a third day.  Nathan Bedford Forrest led a cavalry charge with only a few hundred men and it stopped the Union pursuit.  Really both sides were content to have the battle over, the Union was in the best shape to pursue as Buell's Army of the Ohio had seen the least combat but Shiloh was unlike anything anyone had ever expereinced so all involved were fine to just have the battle over with.

I had been in this area before back when there was zero signage so its impossible a decade later to know if I was in this spot or something a quarter mile away.  There is now a Civil War Trails marker.  The area was called Fallen Timbers because the trees here had all been cut and were still laying on the ground.  It would appear that the trees are all grown up again so it is difficult to see much of the lay of the ground.  But its a nice spot to wrap up the story of Shiloh so I'm sure it will be a spot I visit again on future visits.

Nelson's March

One site we visited was something that was entirely new to us.  We decided to try to follow Nelson's march.  Armed with a local map we followed roads that had to have been on the old roadbed.  Much of it was still dirt roads which was an exciting experience.

Eventually we ended up in a spot where we thought we were close to the river but would need to cross a farmer's field to get there.  The crops were long since out and there was a truck path through the field.  It was a bit muddy so we decided to walk it instead of risking the rental car.  A short distance into the field some locals came along, they were bowhunters and were glad to chat with us.  They offered us a ride in the back of their truck as they said it was probably too muddy for us to walk to the river.  We gladly accepted the ride and ended up at the river a bit south of where Nelson crossed.

Directly across from us was where Dill branch entered the Tennessee River.  In 1862 it would have looked a lot different as that rock wall wouldn't have existed (I would assume that's a TVA improvement) but one can easily imagine what it would have looked like.

And then looking north one can somewhat see where Pittsburg Landing is. 

All in all I think this might have been my favorite part of the Shiloh visit as it was something we had never seen before.  And something we might not have seen without the help of a few local bowhunters.

AS Johnston's headquarters

Since we visited Grant's headquarters it only makes sense to visit Albert Sidney Johnston's as well.  I've been there before.  Its usually a spot I drive past the first time as the only sign for it is a low wooden marker directing you where to turn off highway 22.  Now there is a larger Civil War Trails sign as well as more NPS signs that I remember. 

This is the spot where Johnston camped the night before the battle and where he had a morning council with his generals to decide whether or not to engage the enemy.  The early morning pickets brought on the engagement but Johnston used that as the sign to continue with their plans. 

The site is not NPS property (at least as far as I know) and the homemade information papers inside the large sign at the site would indicate that it isn't NPS as well as one would expect them to have more permanent markers. 

When I first started visiting this spot 10 or so years ago it felt out of the way and seldom visited, today it appears its becoming a more standard spot in the tour even if its not within the official park boundaries.

Grant's Headquarters

Grant's headquarters at the Cherry Mansion in Savannah is actually a site I've been to quite a bit but its nice to see how the interpretation presented there has expanded over the years.  Its a private residence and I've never been there on the few occasions that its been opened for tours, maybe some day but not yet. 

There are quite a few signs there, ranging from the more recent Civil War Trails versions to the older NPS versions, and the even older Tennessee Historical Society signs.

Crump's Landing would be upriver (south) around that curve.  Today the town across the river from Savannah is called Crump's so those structures on the far bank are technically Crump's today but in 1862 Crump's Landing would be around that bend a bit.

The view from the Cherry Mansion into the town of Savannah.  It can't be made oout in the picture but near that gas station is a pair of cannons and cannon ball monument placed by the NPS to mark Grant's headquarters.  It would be placed there to be easily seen by tourists rather than route them through a neighborhood, especially since there wouldn't be a spot to place those cannons in the neighborhood.

Adamsville

During my last visit to Shiloh the park was closed due to the government shutdown so we instead focused on some of the areas outside the park that we've never or seldom visited.  One such site was Adamsville.  I've been there before but its with the park being the crown jewel its not often that I spend much time in Adamsville itself.  Along the road between Savannah and Adamsville, and beyond, there are state historical markers that explain the sites significance but is hampered by a character limit that makes them usually all too general.

Now there is this wonderful little park with a Civil War Trails marker.  Sadly I bet its been up for years showing how long its been since I've been able to tour Shiloh as I like.

Then using a county map we followed the back roads between Adamsville and Shiloh so that we were approximating part of Lew Wallace's march to the battlefield.  Not knowing all the appropriate property ownerships in the area we did not walk the road remnant that would have taken us to Snake Creek.  I know there is NPS land there but not sure how far it extends, and even if we would find much at the creek.  That's a hike for another day.  But this road along the way is almost certainly the road Wallace's division marched along to the battlefield.

Buell's Advance to Pittsburg Landing

I'm always excited to see the newest issue of Tennessee Historical Quarterly appear in my mailbox. There tends to always be at least one Civil War article, sometimes the whole issue is Civil War themed. Also it seems that the past few years have seen quite a few Shiloh articles. This past Wednesday I received the latest issue and there were two Civil War articles and one of them was Shiloh themed.



Donald A. Clark wrote a pretty good piece on the Army of the Ohio's advance from
Nashville to Savannah, arriving in time to see combat on April 7th, with advance units reaching the Shiloh battlefield as the first day's fight was winding down. The article nearly gives a day by day account of the march across middle Tennessee with highlights from soldiers' diaries and letters. I especially liked this as it now seems like I could retrace Buell's route pretty closely.



There are things I wish the author had expanded on. He says that its now clear that Grant's army would have prevailed in the battle even without the assistance from Buell. I'm not 100% in agreement. I think the second day would have gone for the Union and that the Confederates would have retreated back to Corinth. But I think that it would have taken longer for the Union to reclaim its old camps and while in reality Grant did not use April 8th to make it a horrible disaster for the Confederacy that opportunity likely would not have even been possible if Buell had never arrived.



William "Bull" Nelson comes off quite well in the article, a conclusion I too agree with. If he had lived through the war I think he would have made some nice contributions to the Union cause. Clark has written a biography of Nelson that will be coming out this winter from Southern Illinois University.



I do think though that some of Clark's article was clumsy. When he talked about battle sequences he jumbled them up a bit. The article makes it sound like once the Peach Orchard line collapsed Grant started to bring up the siege guns to anchor a line of artillery near the landing. In reality those siege guns had started moving into position earlier in the morning, they are just too heavy for rapid movement. This might just be an editing oversight, if that paragraph had been moved up a few paragraphs it would be in the right order and make perfect sense.



Clark also revealed more about how much Grant and Buell were communicating with each other, something I had not really given much thought. But Grant sent two officers (presumably with some sort of escort) to find Buell as he marched across the state. Clark refers to one as Grant's best scout, which made me wonder how things might have been different if this scout had been available on the morning of April 6 to lead Lew Wallace into position. That is just one of the little things that perhaps changed part of the battle.

Shiloh Maps

Trailhead Graphics has made a new Shiloh map set. Basically it is the Reed map placed onto the modern topo map that serves as the base for the monument map that Trailhead already makes (and is a valuable tool for wandering a battlefield). There are two maps, one for each day. I saw samples last week at the Rocky Mountain Civil War Round Table meeting and it looks fabulous. The map is supposed to go on sale at the park this week. It does not appear yet on the Trailhead Graphics website and I also did not find it on the Eastern National website. I guess you need to call the park bookshop to order a copy. The visitor's center phone number is (731) 689-5696. You can also contact Trailhead Graphics at trailhead@dim.com or 800 390-5117. I can't wait to own this set.

Shiloh Campaign

The Shiloh Campaign Edited by Steven E. Woodworth


Eastern theater battles have long been the beneficiaries of essay filled books. Gary Gallagher has edited roughly a dozen of these books. Now the Western theater is getting the same treatment as Steven Woodworth has embarked on a series of books through Southern Illinois University. Each book will be a collection of essays from some of the leading Western theater historians. The first book in “Civil War Campaigns in the Heartland” is The Shiloh Campaign. It is a pretty balanced collection of essays. There are three which focus on the Union, three on the Confederates and two are on battle events that clearly affected both sides.

In the first chapter John R. Lundberg intends to give a recap of Albert Sidney Johnston’s actions in the Shiloh campaign, beginning roughly with the fall of Fort Donelson. Lundberg believes that Johnston has been unfairly criticized for his actions during this time period. Although the essay is good at recapping Johnston’s activities I do not fully agree with his assessment that Johnston had shown a vast improvement in his abilities as a commander. Of course his performance in the Shiloh campaign was better than his performance during the Forts Henry-Donelson campaign, his performance there was below par. So while he was making an improvement he was still not living up to Jefferson Davis’ earlier assessment of his abilities. Lundberg says that Johnston “might conceivably have become as great a field commander as Lee or Jackson.” This seems doubtful given his performance so far. Lundberg is most likely right though when he says “His death at Shiloh lengthened the odds against Confederate success in the West and thus ultimately in the war as a whole.” Of course that is only right because the commanders who replaced Johnston over the next three years did not achieve great results. We’ll never know if Johnston would have done much better.

Stuart’s defense of the Union left is one of the lesser known actions of the battle but it gets covered here by Alexander Mendoza. He does a good job explaining the flow of battle but his times do not coincide with the times listed on the markers and monuments on the field. He credits Stuart with holding his main position til 3 pm, but all the markers say the position was held until 2 pm. If his times are to be believed then Johnston was killed in the rear of Stuart’s position.

Timothy B. Smith provides an excellent essay on the Hornets’ Nest in memory, basically how several key figures have shaped our understanding of the Hornets’ Nest in the context of the battle. The main figure at work here is David W. Reed, first historian of the park , who fought in the Hornets’ Nest with the 12th Iowa. Smith argues, convincingly, that the main fighting occurred on either side of the Hornets’ Nest. While it seemed to those Union defenders that they were holding off repeated charges, they were actually facing a small part of the Confederate army while the rest of the army fought elsewhere. Once the rest of the Union army had retreated to the final line at Pittsburg Landing the Confederates focused more attention on this last pocket of resistance. Smith points out that the final line was essentially finished by 4:30, so there was no need for Prentiss and WHL Wallace to stay in the Hornets’ Nest as long as they did. In other words, since the main fighting was elsewhere and the final defensive line was ready at 4:30 the defense of the Hornets’ Nest cannot be the most important action of the day; and yet due to the efforts of Reed it is considered one of the most important parts of the battle.

Lew Wallace’s march is one of the mysteries of the battle. Wallace was a competent general, who had shown some talent earlier in the war and would later turn in respectable performances. Steven Woodworth tackles Lew Wallace’s march well, as he works through the troubled time line created by non-standardized times between commanders. Woodworth is of the opinion that Wallace’s removal from the army had less to do with the speed of the march and more to do with the lack of urgency displayed when it was made clear to Wallace the dire predicament that the army was in.

Gary D. Joiner does a good of explaining the activities of the two Union gunboats. He also briefly talks about how the gunboats used the slope of Dill Branch to deflect their shots towards the Confederate lines. A greater explanation of this would have been helpful as it seems to me that deflecting shells would not have been any more effective than using a higher gun elevation.

The only old essay used is one by Grady McWhiney in which he attacks Beauregard’s “Complete Victory.” McWhiney argues that the Confederates had a chance to break the final line and that the attack was worth trying. Beauregard however decided against making a final attack, even though he had not seen the position and had no way of knowing if the battle was truly won. That did not stop Beauregard from sending off a telegram to Richmond proclaiming a complete victory, which would come back to haunt him.

Charles D. Grear provided an essay on Confederate soldiers’ reactions to the battle but this covered mostly the same topics that Joseph Allan Frank and George A. Reaves dealt with in Seeing the Elephant: Raw Recruits at the Battle of Shiloh.

The final essay concerns the relationship between Grant and Sherman. Brooks D. Simpson blows a few holes in popular Grant stories from the post-Shiloh time frame. The first being a Lincoln story that he had arranged for Halleck to come to Pittsburg Landing after Shiloh to shield Grant from criticisms, when the facts show that Halleck intended to come to Pittsburg Landing once Buell’s army arrived. The other part of this Lincoln story is that he supposedly said “I can’t spare this man, he fights,” but Simpson points out that immediately after the battle Lincoln did ask Halleck if Grant was negligent. We can infer that Lincoln might not have spared Grant if Halleck had answered yes. The second story to get a more critical look is about Sherman convincing Grant to stay with the army. While Sherman might have given that pep talk Halleck also asked Grant to delay leaving the army, a week later Grant would again command an army. Simpson also reminds us that had Sherman turned against Grant in the aftermath of Shiloh it might have meant the end of Grant’s career as Sherman was very well connected politically. Instead Sherman leaped to defend Grant and might have saved his career.

I have one complaint about the book, there are only three maps in the entire book. There is a general overview map in the introduction and two detailed maps in the Hornets’ Nest chapter. I constantly was referring back to the overview map as I read sections. Not every chapter needed maps but some, such as the essays on Stuart’s fight and Wallace’s march, would have been much better with maps. Then there are minor issues with the book, such as there is no essay on Buell’s forces or coverage of the second day of battle.

This review also appears in the December issue of Civil War News.

Update on Shiloh presentation

I'm currently working on a presentation for the Rocky Mountain Civil War Round Table in which I'll discuss the fighting around the crossroads at Shiloh. Sherman and McClernand do a masterful job of holding back the many Confederate brigades that are sent against them. I think the fighting here was more important than the better known places like the Sunken Road, but generally the historiography has not ranked it as highly.

To get a better grasp of the fighting I'm reading a ton of official reports. Just now I was reading Major Franklin H. Clack's report of the activities of the Confederate Guard Response Battalion (in Anderson's Brigade). After giving a good account of the capture of a battery he then sums up the rest of the day's action with:

"From this time, sir, until the close of the day I am unable to describe the various localities in which you led us to the attack. We made several other successful charges, being ordered from one part of the field to the other, where our services were most needed."

That really does not help me in placing the unit on the field anywhere else. Oh well. Luckily the placing of one regiment is not a big deal for me, I would have liked to pin point every one but knew going into the project that was impossible.

Shiloh maps

This week I've been working on a Shiloh presentation I'm doing for the Rocky Mountain Civil War Round Table on December 10th. Its on the Crossroads, I'll be covering Sherman and McClernand's area from the first strike in the 53rd Ohio's camp thru the withdrawal after the noon counterattack. The round table is doing a theme lately of focusing on a small aspect of a battle. Last month was the Sunken Road at Antietam, earlier in the year was the Wheatfield of Gettysburg. I think there are others coming up but do not remember right now what they might be.

So the last few days I've been working on my maps. I scanned in the park service brochure and then edited out all the modern stuff I didn't want, like tour stops and modern names for roads. Then using the Trailhead Graphics map I put on the locations of every marker and monument. Its not perfect as the scale is different but I put each one as close as I could, and since no one is going to use my map in the field it does not need to be 100% accurate. For all the maps I used the marker's numeric designation. Later I'll either add a legend or will change the numbers to regimental designations.

First I have a map showing all the Union camp sites and I've added the brigade commanders' names and drawn lines to show how each brigade was scattered, or kept together as the case might be.



Then I made a map showing only the markers for this fighting, and my time frame only.




Then I made a map with the monuments for all the units involved. I would like to add the monuments to the markers map too but I think it will be too cluttered in this scale.

Then I made maps with just Union and Confederate positions, these versions don't show monuments but I think I have the space to add them. I also made versions that only show the positions for each division and each brigade but those are more for sorting my own notes.

This is the Union version:

And the Confederate:

Future ideas for the maps:

1) Depending on how cluttered it is, so it might be a divisional level map, draw a line between positions each regiment held so that you could clearly see where they moved to.

2) Make a map for each distinct time period that shows positions for both sides. I will be doing these, still fine tuning how many maps and the times represented.

At the actual presentation I will probably pass out a small packet of the maps (probably about 4) and then use the projector to show many more maps as I talk. So I'm willing to make a ton of maps because I know I don't have to print every single one.

I posted this early look at my maps with the hope my readers would offer some input on the whole deal.

Confederate Order of Battle for Shiloh

ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI
Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston, (killed) commanding
Col. Wm. Preston, volunteer aid (OR Report)

Gen. P.G. T. Beauregard, commanding, Monday (OR Report)
Col. Jacob Thompson, volunteer aid (OR Report)


FIRST CORPS
Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk (OR Report)
Maj. Smith P. Bankhead, Chief of Artillery (OR Report)
Surg W. D. Lyles, Medical Director (OR Report)


FIRST DIVISION
Brig. Gen. Charles Clark (wounded) (OR Report) (Supplement OR Report)
First Brigade
Col. Robert M. Russell (OR Report)
11th Louisiana (OR Report)
12th Tennessee (OR Report) (OR Report)
13th Tennessee (OR Report)
22d Tennessee
Bankhead’s Tennessee Battery


Second Brigade
Brig. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart (OR Report)
13th Arkansas (OR Report) (OR Report)
4th Tennessee (OR Report)
5th Tennessee (OR Report)
33d Tennessee (OR Report)
Stanford’s Mississippi Battery (OR Report)

SECOND DIVISION
Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham (wounded) (OR Report)

First Brigade
Brig. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson (wounded) (OR Report)
Blythe's Mississippi
Walker’s 2d Tennessee
15th Tennessee
154th Senior Tennessee (OR Report) (OR Report)
Polk’s Tennessee Battery

Second Brigade
Col. William H. Stephens (OR Report) (Maney’s OR Report)
7th Kentucky (OR Report)
1st Tennessee Battalion
6th Tennessee
9th Tennessee
Smith’s Mississippi Battery

Cavalry
1st Mississippi (OR Report) (OR Report)
Mississippi and Alabama Battalion (OR Report)

Unattached
47th Tennessee (arrived on field April 7)


SECOND ARMY CORPS
Maj. Gen. Braxton Bragg (OR Report)

FIRST DIVISION
Brig. Gen. Daniel Ruggles (OR Report)

First Brigade
Col. Randall L. Gibson (OR Report)
1st Arkansas (OR Report)
4th Louisiana (OR Report)
13th Louisiana (OR Report)
19th Louisiana (OR Report)
Vaiden, or Bain's Mississippi Battery


Second Brigade
Brig. Gen. Patton Anderson (OR Report)
1st Florida Battalion (OR Report)
17th Louisiana (OR Report)
20th Louisiana (OR Report)
Confederate Guards Response Battalion (OR Report)
9th Texas (OR Report)
Washington (Louisiana) Artillery, Fifth Company (OR Report)

Third Brigade
Col. Preston Pond, Jr. (OR Report)
16th Louisiana (OR Report)
18th Louisiana (OR Report)
Crescent (Louisiana) Regiment (OR Report)
Orleans Guard (Louisiana) Battalion
38th Tennessee (OR Report)
Ketchum's Alabama Battery (OR Report)

Cavalry
1st Alabama Cavalry Battalion (OR Report)
Prattville Dragoons (OR Report)
Mathew Rangers (OR Report)
Robins’ Cavalry (OR Report)


SECOND DIVISION
Brig. Gen. Jones M. Withers (OR Report)

First Brigade
Brig. Gen. Adley H. Gladden (mortally wounded)
Col. Daniel W. Adams (wounded) (OR Report) (Deas’ OR Report) (Loomis' OR Report)
21st Alabama (OR Report)
22d Alabama (OR Report) (OR Report)
25th Alabama (OR Report)
26th Alabama (OR Report)
1st Louisiana
Robertson's Alabama Battery

Second Brigade
Brig. Gen. James R. Chalmers (OR Report)
5th Mississippi
7th Mississippi
9th Mississippi
10th Mississippi
52d. Tennessee
Gage's Alabama Battery

Third Brigade
Brig. Gen. John K. Jackson (OR Report) (Moore’s OR Report)
17th Alabama
18th Alabama (OR Report)
19th Alabama (OR Report)
2d Texas (OR Report)
Girardey's Georgia Battery (OR Report)

Cavalry
Clanton's Alabama Regiment

THIRD ARMY CORPS
Maj. Gen. William J. Hardee (wounded) (OR Report)

First Brigade
Brig. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman (disabled), commanding his own and Third Brigade
Col. R. G. Shaver (disabled) (OR Report)
2d Arkansas (OR Report)
6th Arkansas
7th Arkansas (OR Report)
3d Confederate
Warren Light Artillery, or Swett's Mississippi Battery,
Pillow's Flying Artillery, or Miller's Tennessee Battery,

Second Brigade
Brig. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne (OR Report)
15th Arkansas
6th Mississippi
Bate’s 2d Tennessee (OR Report) (OR Report)
5th (35th) Tennessee (OR Report)
23d Tennessee (OR Report)
24th Tennessee

Shoup's Battalion
Trigg's (Austin) Arkansas Battery
Calvert's (Helena) Arkansas Battery
Hubbard's Arkansas Battery

Third Brigade
Brig. Gen. Sterling A. M. Wood (disabled) (OR Report)
16th Alabama (OR Report)
8th Arkansas (OR Report)
9th (14th ) Arkansas (battalion) (OR Report)
3d Mississippi Battalion (OR Report)
27th Tennessee (OR Report)
44th Tennessee (OR Report)
55th Tennessee
Harper's (Jefferson Mississippi) Battery (OR Report) (OR Report)
Avery’s Georgia Dragoons (OR Report)


RESERVE CORPS
Brig. Gen. John C. Breckinridge (OR Report)

First Brigade
Col. Robert P. Trabue (OR Report)
Clifton's 4th Alabama Battalion
31st Alabama
3d Kentucky
4th Kentucky
5th Kentucky
6th Kentucky
Crew's Tennessee Battalion
Lyon's (Cobb's) Kentucky Battery
Byrne's Mississippi Battery
Morgan’s Squadron Kentucky Cavalry

Second Brigade
Brig. Gen. John S. Bowen (wounded) (Martin’s OR Report)
9th Arkansas (OR Report)
10th Arkansas
2d Confederate
1st Missouri
Pettus Flying Artillery, or Hudson's Mississippi Battery
Watson's Louisiana Battery
Thompson's Company Kentucky Cavalry

Third Brigade
Col. Winfield S. Statham, 15th Mississippi
15th Mississippi
22d Mississippi
19th Tennessee
20th Tennessee
28th Tennessee
45th Tennessee
Rutledge's Tennessee Battery
Forrest's Regiment Tennessee Cavalry

Unattached
Wharton's Texas Regiment Cavalry (OR Report)
Wirt Adams's Mississippi Regiment Cavalry
McClung's Tennessee Battery
Roberts Arkansas Battery

Principles of War: US Grant

Yesterday I covered Albert Sidney Johnston in the Shiloh campaign based on a modern list of principles of war. Today its Grant's turn.

Objective: Did he direct every military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective? Yes. On the first day it was more about holding ground when possible so that other parts of the army were not opened up to attack. This worked well with the exception of the Hornets' Nest and there Prentiss had an earlier opportunity to leave, he just held on to late. On the second day the objective is clear, recapture what was lost, this was attainable and was decisive.

Offensive: Did he seize, retain, and exploit the initiative? His opportunity for this comes on the second day and he does a wonderful job of doing this. On the first day Sherman and McClernand lead a counter attack that seizes and exploits the initiative but they do not retain it. They also act on their own so we cannot credit Grant with this.

Mass: Did he concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time? This one is a little tough to answer. He does do a good job of parceling out his reserve units on the first day sending Hurlbut to the far left and WHL Wallace into the center. A few other regiments and brigades are separated from their parent unit and are sent out to other portions of the field. But what is the decisive point on the battlefield? Yesterday I said for the Confederates it was the Peach Orchard as that then led to the fall of the Hornets' Nest. But perhaps the decisive point on the battlefield is the final line at Pittsburg Landing. In that case Beauregard did a poor job (Johnston was dead by this time) in that he did not commit to the attack and canceled the attack that was naturally being made. And then Grant does a good job because the final line has all available men ready for the attack. On the second day Grant really doesn't concentrate his men for a decisive blow, he simply swamps the Confederates with too many men (many of them fresh from Lew Wallace and Don Carlos Buell) all along the line. Overall I guess I would say that Grant did a good job with this principle.

Economy of Force: Did he allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts? In a sense there was no secondary efforts. Grant faced Confederates everywhere on both days so he had his men spread out roughly evenly both days. Not sure what he could have done differently on this front.

Maneuver: Did he place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power? Not sure what is meant by flexible application, Grant surely didn't shuffle men to overpower one particular point. On the first day he reinforced areas that needed it. On the second day his men were spread out everywhere, in about the same strength everywhere, there was just too many Union soldiers to be held back forever. I think I'll answer no for this one. After the battle he had an opportunity at Fallen Timbers to do more, especially if he had sent out more men than he did, so we should probably mark him down a bit for that as well.

Unity of Command: Did he ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander, for every objective? I think he did okay on this one and it was more by luck than be design. He did not assign a commander to an area he just ended up with relatively good commanders in each area. Sherman and McClernand did a good job on the right. WHL Wallace and Prentiss did not face as rough a task in the center as post battle writings would indicate but they did good with the task they faced. They stayed in the position longer than they needed to but they were following Grant's orders to the fullest ("hold at all hazards") I think Hurlbut did a good job on the left although he hardly seems to get any acclaim for it.

Security: Did he permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage? One of Grant's failings. The Confederates gained the unexpected advantage with the early morning attack. Grant and Sherman may later claim that they were prepared but the manner (slightly foreshadowing the next principle) definitely was a surprise.

Surprise: Did he strike the enemy at a time or place, or in a manner, for which he is unprepared? As I just mentioned Grant was on the receiving end on this one. The manner definitely surprised him and caught him unprepared. One could argue that the place was not so much a surprise as there was only a limited front the Confederates could attack, unless they went for Lew Wallace well north of the main camp. The place was unprepared as there were no entrenchments made prior to April 6th, some will be made that night. And the timing was a bit of a surprise. The evidence had been mounting that the Confederates were more active near the camps, so I think realistically Grant figured there would be some sort of fight in the coming week. But I think he imagined it as a fight between a few companies or regiments, not 100,000 men engaged for two full days. Grant's attack on the second day doe snot catch the Confederates unprepared, the only way he could have accomplished this is if he had made a flank attack, that would have meet the manner portion of the principle. But a flank attack would have been nearly impossible to make due to the creeks and swamps that defined the edges of the battlefield.

Simplicity: Did he prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding? A bit of both. Certainly Lew Wallace did not receive clear orders or there would not have been any controversy over his march. Most everyone else did get clear orders but those orders were rather simple, hold on as best you can and retreat slowly. Prentiss was told to hold to the last when Grant might have meant hold until it really didn't need to be held any more, but Grant probably hoped his final line might not be right at the Landing. If Hurlbut, Sherman and McClernand had been able to create a final line that connected to the Hornets' Nest position than those earlier orders were perfect. But once everyone else had retreated Prentiss should have joined them, he waited too long and it cost the army about 2000 men captured. As army commander Grant deserves some blame for Prentiss staying too long; once it was clear Prentiss was alone Grant probably should have sent orders to join everyone at the Landing.

In all I think Grant did a good job on four of the principles with one that was a bit of both. Yesterday I rated Johnston as good on three with two mixed. I'm not sure any commander fought a battle and met all nine principles. It'll be fun to tackle some other battles in the future, I hope to make a series of this, maybe doing a battle every other week, or as the mood strikes.

Principles of War: AS Johnston

The other day I was going through a pile of xeroxes I had made months earlier and stumbled on this nugget that I had since forgotten about. It is a list of principles of war. I showed it to a buddy who is a retired colonel and he said that this is an army list and not something some author created. He said other countries’ armies have similar lists and he went through them briefly with me. Anyway here is the list and then I thought I’d examine Albert Sidney Johnston in the Shiloh campaign by this list.

Objective: Direct every military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.

Offensive: Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

Mass: Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time.

Economy of Force: Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.

Maneuver: Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.

Unity of Command: For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander.

Security: Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.

Surprise: Strike the enemy at a time or place, or in a manner, for which he is unprepared.

Simplicity: Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.



So now Johnston’s review
Objective: Did he direct every military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective? Not really. Johnston and Beauregard were operating on different plans. They committed troops to battle in different areas. Now if one plan had been stuck with then it might meet this criteria with the main debate being if the objective was attainable.

Offensive: Did he seize, retain, and exploit the initiative? As best he could while alive, yes. Of course there are going to be lulls in a battle and some missed opportunities, but by and large Johnston did a good job on this score.

Mass: Did he concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time? Yes and no. The original attack did not really do this as each corps was stretched across the width of the battlefield. Then Beauregard sends men towards the Crossroads (which I don’t think could be called the decisive point as taking this position did not win the battle). To finally make the Peach Orchard line fall, which led to the capture of Prentiss’ men, Johnston did concentrate his power. Although there were not too many brigades to concentrate he did what he could with what he had. There was not a huge attack with every brigade at his disposal but he funneled the men he had into the attack that finally caused the Peach Orchard area to fall. Not a huge concentration so my yes on this question is lukewarm at best.

Economy of Force: Did he allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts? No, because Beauregard and Johnston worked at cross purposes. Beauregard tended to funnel men into the attack on Sherman and McClernand on the Confederate left while Johnston was on the right directing the attacks. The allocation of combat power was seriously messed up.

Maneuver: Did he place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power? No. The Union fell back to a nice line near Pittsburg Landing.

Unity of Command: Did he ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander, for every objective? No. The attack plan with each corps attacking in one long line meant that the corps commanders never had control over their corps.

Security: Did he permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage? No. The Confederates were the one that gained the unexpected advantage with the early morning attack. Johnston finally scores one solidly in his column.

Surprise: Did he strike the enemy at a time or place, or in a manner, for which he is unprepared? Once again this one is clearly one Johnston did right. Truthfully for this one and the previous one the Union did a lot wrong to allow Johnston to do well with surprise and security but he still did well.

Simplicity: Did he prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding? I almost want to say yes because allow the method of attack was flawed it was understandable. Everyone joined the battle fairly well. But Beauregard’s orders and Johnston’s plan were not the same. Beauregard orders forced the action towards the Landing while Johnston was hoping to turn the Union away from the Landing.

For the nine principles I give Johnston good scores on three with two others that are a little of both. Tomorrow I’ll tackle Grant’s performance at Shiloh.

Top Shiloh books

The folks over at the Shiloh discussion board are doing their own top Shiloh books, perhaps inspired by the recent Gettysburg blog carnival. Brett at TOWOC asked if I would be interested in participating and so here I am. Instead of a top 10 they went with a top 7.


1 Shiloh and the Western Campaign of 1862 by O. Edward Cunningham
I'd often run into references of this manuscript as the premier study of Shiloh. Eventually I got tired of hearing about it and got a copy of the dissertation thru interlibrary loan, and I made my own copy. A few years later Tim Smith and Gary Joiner edited the dissertation for the University of Tennessee Press so now we can all get our hands on this book. And it is a great book. My fault with the dissertation was a lack of maps but that has been fixed in the UT printing.

2 Battle of Shiloh and the Organizations Engaged by DW Reed
Reed was the first historian at Shiloh and this book is really the first history of the battle. Once again UT Press has made Shiloh easier to research as they recently reprinted this book. Copies of this book were included in most of the state monument commission books so it isn't too hard to find the text. But it is now much nicer to not worry about potentially damaging a 100 year old book. The text is a little dry as Reed was more concerned with laying out facts about troop movements than weaving an interesting anecdote filled story. Reed is also responsible for the cast iron tablets on the battlefield today.

3 Shiloh: The battle that Changed the Civil War by Larry Daniel
Until Cunningham's dissertation was finally published Daniel's book was my favorite of the three modern works on the battle. It doesn't have all the detail that Sword's book (see below) has but it places the battle in the context of the war better than Sword did.

4 Seeing the Elephant: Raw Recruits and the Battle of Shiloh by Joseph Allan Frank and George A. Reaves
Shiloh is one of the few battles that has large numbers of raw soldiers seeing combat for the first time. Even in other battles, like Perryville or Stones River, that feature many new troops there were also quite a few veterans in the army. In fact outside of Bull Run I'm not sure there is another battle that features so many fresh troops without a sizable veteran contingent. Frank and Reaves sifted through the archives at the park to describe the experience Shiloh's raw troops had. Its not a blow by blow account but is a wonderful way to get the feel for the soldiers' experience.

5 Untold Story of Shiloh by Tim Smith
In this volume Smith tries to fill in some of the gaps in the story of Shiloh. Some of this involves attacking the persistent myths, some of it is simply telling the stories that got shifted to the side.

6 Shiloh, Shells and Artillery Units by George Witham
I consult this book quite often when I need information on artillery units at Shiloh. It is not a narrative but more of an encyclopedia. For every unit at the battle Witham will say what type of cannon they had, how many men were there, how many casualties they suffered, list the officers and then usually have a portion of the Official Records to explain what they did at the battle. There are also many pictures of the different types of shells as well as many pictures of cannon on the field. Some batteries get better treatment as there was more information available for Witham to use, and some entries also include pictures of the men who served the guns.

7 Shiloh: Bloody April by Wiley Sword
I was really conflicted over which book to list, Sword's or James Lee McDonough's "Shiloh: In Hell Before Night." Both are very good but in different ways. McDonough provides a good overview and deals with the battle from the brigade level on up. Sword goes down to the regimental level. I went with Sword in this spot because I've probably consulted it more often than McDonough over the years.

There are many other great Shiloh books out there. I'm fond of:
This Great Battlefield of Shiloh by Tim Smith (focuses on the formation of the park up to 1933)
Shiloh: A Novel by Shelby Foote (a great book I end up reading once a year)
Shiloh and Corinth: Sentinels of Stone by Timothy Isbell
Eyewitnesses at the Battle of Shiloh by David Logsdon
War College Guide to the Battle of Shiloh by Jay Luvaas, Steven Bowman and Leonard Fullenkamp

I also am interested in reading The Shiloh Campaign edited by Steven Woodworth. Its a collection of essays on the campaign that was published earlier this year and I still have not picked up a copy (shame on me).

Albert Sidney Johnston

A few months ago my buddy Mike was in Austin and took some pictures of Albert Sidney Johnston's grave for me, and to share here. After the battle of Shiloh Johnston was buried in New Orleans but was moved to Texas in 1867.

Outside of Johnston's grave there is a Confederate section.

There are quite a few other Civil War notables in the Texas State Cemetery, as well as many other important figures in Texas history. One of the Civil War notables Mike snapped a picture of was Major General John Austin Wharton. Wharton commanded the Texas Rangers at Shiloh and was steadily promoted throughout the war. He was killed near the end of the conflict by George W. Baylor, a fellow officer, due to "an unpleasant misunderstanding of military matters." Apparently the problem arose over the reorganization of the Trans-Mississippi department and Wharton called Baylor a liar and slapped him. Baylor replied with his pistol while Wharton was unarmed.